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This article traces the fundamental descriptive features of
schizophrenia described in the European continental litera-
ture form Kraepelin and Bleuler, culminating with thecrea-
tion of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-8
(1974).Therewasaconsensusamongtheresearchersthatthe
specificityandtypicalityofschizophreniawasanchoredtoits
‘‘fundamental’’clinicalcore(withtraitstatus)andnottopos-
itive psychotic features, which were considered as ‘‘state’’,
‘‘accessory’’ phenomena.Theclinicalcoreofschizophrenia
was,inadilutedform,constitutiveofthespectrumconditions
(‘‘schizoidia’’and‘‘latentschizophrenia’’).Thefundamental
features are manifest across all domains of consciousness:
subjectiveexperience,expression,cognition,affectivity,be-
havior, and willing. Yet, the specificity of the core was only
graspable at a more comprehensive Gestalt-level, variously
designated(eg,discordance,autism,‘‘Spaltung’’),andnoton
the level of single features. In other words, the phenomeno-
logical specificity was seen as being expressive of a funda-
mental structural or formal change of the patient’s
mentality (consciousness, subjectivity). This overall change
transpires through the single symptoms and signs, lending
them a characteristic phenomenological pattern. This con-
ceptof schizophreniabearslittleresemblancetothecurrent
operational definitions. The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, and ICD-10
seemtodiagnoseasubsetofpatientswithchronicparanoid-
hallucinatory variant of schizophrenia.
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Introduction
The purpose of this contribution is to make a panoptic at-
tempt to describe how schizophrenia was conceptualized in
the continental European psychiatry and described since
Bleuler and Kraepelin and as recently as in the 8th and
9th editions of the International Classification of Diseases
(ICD) ie, in practical clinical use in Europe at least until the
introduction of the ICD-10
1 in 1992.
Theknowledgeofthecorefeatureshasgraduallyfaded
away in the operational permutations of the schizophre-
nia concept. This notion becomes increasingly alien to
clinicians. This is partly due to a reification of diagnostic
categories, associated with a general decline of psycho-
pathological competence.
2
A centenary of the publication of Bleuler’s ‘‘Dementia
Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias’’ is a pretext
forthisreflection.Thereadershouldnotexpectahistorical
exegesisofBleuler’sideas.Rather,thegoalwillbetotrace
the evolution of the concept of the clinical core of schizo-
phrenia into its common continental articulation in ICD-
8,
3beforethecreationofDiagnosticandStatisticalManual
of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, (DSM-III).
4
Thepreoperationalnotionofschizophreniamaybecon-
sidered as a zenith of psychopathologicresearch, creating
conditions for the first major scientific accomplishments,
eg, the foundational Scandinavian epidemiological stud-
ies,
5 the US-DK Adoption studies,
6 the US-DK high-
risk studies,
7 longitudinal patient follow-up studies,
8,9
andtheWHO’sInternationalPilotStudiesofSchizophre-
nia.
10 The modifications of the concept of schizophrenia
that happened in the DSM-III-DSM-IV-TR
4,11 and the
ICD-10entailobviousandimportantclinicalandresearch
consequences.
What is Schizophrenia?
Thistrivialquestionhidescertainimportantepistemolog-
ical issues, intimately linked to the question of a ‘‘clinical
core’’. The DSM-IV-TR
11 defines schizophrenia in the
following way:
Theessentialfeaturesofschizophreniaareamixtureofchar-
acteristic ( . ) positive and negative [symptoms] that have
been present for a significant portion of time ( . ), associ-
ated with marked social and occupational dysfunction. The
disturbance is not better accounted for by .
Maj
12criticizedthisdefinitionfornotofferinganygen-
eralaccountofwhatschizophreniaisbutratherofwhatit
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1121is not (nonorganic, nonaffective, etc.). The definition
does not consider negative or positive symptoms (or their
combinations) as specific to schizophrenia. Moreover,
Maj claimed that operational criteria are only useful to
a clinician who is already familiar with what schizophre-
nia is. The issue addressed by Maj is that of ‘‘whatness’’
(quiddity). It refers to the properties that a particular cat-
egory (eg, a patient) shares with others of its kind. ‘What
(quid) is it?’ simply asks for a general description through
some essential or prototypical commonality.
Asking such question does not presuppose a commit-
ment to realism about natural kinds. It is a question
prompted by clinical experience and based on the as-
sumption that schizophrenia displays a characteristic
core Gestalt, conferring a certain typicality or prototypi-
cality on its concrete clinical manifestations. It is not the
question of a pathognomonic symptom but rather of
a characteristic Gestalt.
The question of the core dominated the psychiatric de-
bate since the beginning of the 20th century.
‘‘Fundamental’’ Symptoms
Europeanpsychopathologistsagreedthattherewassome-
thing phenomenologically distinctive and typical about
schizophrenia, a ‘‘something’’, a characteristic ‘‘what-
ness.’’ It resides in a prototypical core whose properties
are not temporally fluctuating ‘‘surface’’ psychotic symp-
toms, but the features that reflect a phenomenological
depth or a structure of the disorder. Here, it is important
toemphasizethatthecoreisnotmerelyaconstructbutpos-
sesses phenomenological reality. It is perceivable and ac-
cessible to observation. Although it may be difficult to
defineverbally,itisopentoostensivedefinitionandhence
to teaching, intersubjective agreement, and analysis. The
core was considered, by and large, as a trait condition.
Thediagnosticspecificitywasanchoredintheprototypical
Gestalt of the illness.
Bleuler(inspiredbyHecker’s
13descriptionofhebephre-
nia)wasamongthefirsttodistinguishbetweenthefunda-
mentalsymptoms,specifictoschizophreniaandspecifying
its spectrum extension (schizoidia, latent schizophrenia)
and accessory symptoms, nonspecific state phenomena,
marking a psychotic episode (hallucinations, delusions,
andflamboyantcatatonicfeatures).Thefundamentalfea-
tures—also emphasized by Kraepelin and others—were
many: autism, formal thought disorder, ambivalence, af-
fective-emotional,andaffect-expressivechanges,changes
inthestructure oftheperson, disordersofvolition,acting
and behavior, and the socalled ‘‘schizophrenic dementia’’
(which Bleuler did not conceived on the analogy with or-
ganic dementia
14,15).
The fundamental symptoms overlap each other, with
descriptive redundancies. We will therefore concentrate
on the prime fundamental symptom, the schizophrenic
autism, which contains aspects of nearly all other funda-
mental symptoms as well. The autism concept became, in
Europe, a shorthand term for the core Gestalt of schizo-
phrenia, or for schizophrenia, tout court.
Autism: Withdrawal to Fantasy Life
Bleuler
16 defined autism as a detachment from reality as-
sociated with rich fantasy life:
The [. . .] schizophrenics, who have no more contact with the
outsideworldliveinaworldoftheirown.Theyhaveencased
themselves with their desires and wishes [. . .]; they have cut
themselvesoffasmuch aspossiblefromanycontactwiththe
external world. This detachment from reality with the rela-
tive and absolute predominance of the inner life, we term
autism.
He described a rich variety of clinical manifestations
under the heading of autism: poor ability to enter into
contact with others, withdrawal and/or inaccessibility,
negativistic tendencies, indifference, rigid attitudes and
behaviors,privatehierarchyofvaluesandgoals,inappro-
priate expression and behavior, idiosyncratic logic and
thinking,andapropensitytodelusionformation.Thede-
scription includes interrelated expressive, behavioral,
subjective (cognitive, affective), and existential aspects.
17
This multitude, Bleuler and others explained, was caused
by a disaggregation, dissociation (loosening of associa-
tions), ‘‘Spaltung,’’ or discordance between and within
the modes and contents of consciousness.
18 Autism man-
ifests a discordance in the operations of consciousness.
Henri Ey
19 a renowned French psychiatrist, summarized
the clinical expressions of the ‘‘discordance’’ in 5 general
dimensions:
‘‘(1)Ambivalence:adivisionofallstatesoroperationsofthe
mind into contradictory tendencies: desire/fear-repulsion;
willing/not willing; affirmation/negation. (2) Bizarreness:
impressionofastrangenessthatseemstoreflectadisconcert-
ing intention of the paradoxical or the illogical. (3) Impen-
etrability: all schizophrenic symptoms appear to be imbued
by an enigmatic tonality; there is always some opacity of the
understanding in the relations between the patient and the
others. (4) Detachment: loss of vital contact with reality
20
[lackofattunement,lossoftheworld’snaturalself-evidence,
inability of immersion in the world, solipsism]. (5) ‘‘Destruc-
turation’’ of consciousness [ie, disorder of subjectivity struc-
ture; see below]’’
19(p53) (my translation and additions in
square brackets).
Bleuler’s description of autism demonstrates its resil-
ience to a medical definition. The definition of autism as
a ‘‘withdrawal to fantasy life’’ became trivialized along
the common-sense psychological and psychodynamic
understanding: All can turn their back to an unpleasant
or threatening reality and engage in a wishful thinking.
What is overlooked in such a comparison is the fact that
inschizophrenia,aconfinementto interiority(innerlife)
is not primarily due to a voluntary choice to withdraw,
but is more like an affliction or existential destiny.
J. Parnas
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intuition of the schizophrenic trait phenomena, the con-
ceptual resources at his disposal did not permit a clear
articulation of this intuition.
Autism As a Phenomenon with Subjective Dimension
Thepanoply ofclinical features makingup the concept of
autism is beyond what the notion of a symptom can con-
tain.Awareoftheproblem,butnotofthesolution,Bleuler
qualified autism as a ‘‘complex’’ symptom. Phenomeno-
logical notions of Gestalt and prototype offer more ade-
quate conceptualizations here: autism is not an atomic
single symptom but a phenomenon or a Gestalt, a certain
wholereflectingaradicallyalteredmentallife.Itisperceiv-
able in the ways in which mentality (subjectivity, con-
sciousness) operates and manifests itself. It is this
alteration that transpires through the manifold of clinical
manifestations of schizophrenia.
Euge `ne Minkowski
20 a French psychiatrist trained by
Bleuler, was the first to grasp the notion of the core of
schizophrenia on an adequate theoretical level. He did
not think that the core of schizophrenia could be
addressed by a list-wise description of single symptoms.
What was needed was a background theory on the nature
ofmentallife,apositionthathesharedwithJaspers
21and
for both authors, it was phenomenology that was rele-
vant. Minkowski proposed that a mental state (eg, a hal-
lucination) should not be treated in isolation and as
a thing because it is an aspect, a trace of the whole
from which it originates. This whole is the structure of
subjectivity. Every anomalous mental state contains
therefore an imprint of more basic experiential and
existential alterations, comprising, for example, changes
in time and space experience, self-experience or altera-
tions in the elementary relatedness to the world. It is
such structural alterations that transpire phenomenally
in the single symptoms, shaping them, keeping them
meaningfully interconnected, and founding the specific-
ity of the overall diagnostic Gestalt.
22 Minkowski
20 con-
sideredautismasadisorderofself(troubledelastructure
intime du moi), marked by an inadequate basic prereflec-
tive attunement between the person and his world, ie,
a lack of immersion in the world, lack of ‘‘vital contact
with reality’’. Minkowski defined the ‘‘vital contact’’ as an
ability to ‘‘resonate with the world’’, to empathize with
others, an ability to become affected, and to act suitably,
as a prereflective immersion in the intersubjective world:
‘‘Without being ever able to formulate it, we know what
we have to do; and it is that that makes our activity
infinitely malleable and human.’’ Manifestations of autism
involve a peculiar distortion of the relationship of the
person to himself, to the world, and to his fellow men.
There is a decline of the dynamic, flexible, and malleable
aspects of these relations, and a corresponding pre-
dominance of the fixed, static, rational, and objectified
elements (one of our patients said: ‘‘I am unable to go
directly to the world; for me, the world is always a matter
of composition; there are no simple givens’’). Autism may
also transpire through the patient’s acting. Autistic activity
shows itself not so much through its content or purpose,
but more through an inappropriate manner by which it
is enacted, its friction with the situational context (‘‘crazy
actions’’
23;s e e
24, for several examples). A famous vignette
ofa‘‘schizoid’’father,whobuys,asaChristmaspresentfor
his dying daughter, a coffin, illustrates this friction. The act
is rational from a formal-logical point of view because,
ultimately, the daughter is going to need a coffin, yet
the act is nonetheless bizarre by any human standard of
our culture.
Autism as ‘‘Crisis of Common Sense’’: Exploring
Subjective Dimension
The subjective dimension of autism, addressed by Min-
kowski, became further articulated by a contemporary
German psychiatrist, Wolfgang Blankenburg
25 who con-
sidered autism as ‘‘a crisis of common sense’’.
What is at stake in common sense is not a possession
of a sufficient stock of explicit or implicit knowledge of
the world that can be expressed in sentence-like terms: eg,
‘‘I know that one says hello to greet the others’’. Rather,
itistheabilitytoseethingsintheappropriateperspective,
animplicitnonconceptualgripofthe‘‘rulesofthegame,’’
a sense of proportion, a taste for what is adequate and
appropriate, likely, and relevant. Briefly, it refers to
anonconceptualandnonreflectiveindwellingintheinter-
subjective world, a preunderstanding of the context and
background, a necessary condition for the grasp of of
objects, other people, and situations. The patient finds
himself in a pervasive state of ambivalence and perplexity
(confusion about meaning). The loss of meaning is fre-
quently associated with intense hyperreflectivity, ie, an
excessive tendency to monitor, and thereby objectify,
one’s own experiences and actions.
26 Everything may be-
come a matter of deliberation (Why is the grass green;
why has the nature chosen this particular color?), relating
to others is felt disfigured, requiring preparatory efforts.
There is no evident way to choose among options or to be
sure of one’s own opinion. Blankenburg presents a case
of a young female schizophrenic patient, whose monot-
onous complaint is the lack of naturalness, lack of ’self-
evidentness’ and ’self-understandability’ (Selbstversta ¨nd-
lichkeit):
What is it that I really lack? Something so small, so comic,
but so unique and important that you cannot live without it
[. . .]. What I lack really is the ’natural evidence’ [. . .]. It has
simply to do with living, how to behave yourself in order not
to be pushed outside, outside society. But I cannot find the
right word for that which is lacking in me [. . .]. It is not
knowledge, it is prior to knowledge; it is something that ev-
ery child is equipped with. It is these very simple things
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The Clinical Core of Schizophreniaa human being has the need for, to carry on life, how to act,
to be with other people, to know the rules of the game.’’ [. . .]
Another patient writes to his friend: ‘‘For your happiness,
yourlenienceandyoursecurity,youcanthank’asomething’
ofwhichyouarenoteven conscious.This’something’ isfirst
ofallthatwhichmakesleniencepossible.Itprovidesthefirst
ground.
Not surprisingly, lacking this ‘‘something so small, so
comic’’goes handinhand withanotherlack,namelyadi-
minishedsenseofself,lackinginner,persistentcoreofthe
person.
27
The Structure of Subjectivity: Self in Schizophrenia
Abriefarticulationofthestructureofsubjectivityorcon-
sciousness is now needed to grasp the notion of the dis-
ordersoftheselfinthecoreGestaltofschizophrenia.The
concept of self can be addressed at different levels of re-
ality and abstraction. Here, we are concerned with its ba-
sic universal experiential aspects.
28 This ordinary
phenomenological notion of the self means that we live
our conscious life in the first person perspective, as
a self-present, single, temporally persistent, embodied,
and bounded (demarcated) entity, who is the subject of
his experiences.
29 That these basic structural aspects of
self-hoodmaybecomealteredorevenshatteredinschizo-
phrenia was noted already at the very conception of the
notion the illness. Bleuler
16 considered self-disorders as
belonging to the ‘‘complex fundamental symptoms’’ (af-
fecting the person). He wrote that the patient’s ego tends
to undergo ‘‘the most manifold alterations,’’ eg, splitting
and loss of the directedness of thinking. ‘‘A very intelli-
gent person needs hours of strenuous effort to find her
ownegoforafewbriefmoments’’;‘‘patientscannotcatch
up with themselves’’ or they ‘‘have lost their individual
self’’
16 (p143). Gruhle
30 talked about the disordered self-
hood as reflecting a specific existential tonality of being
in schizophrenia. Kraepelin
31 considered ‘‘loss of inner
unityofconsciousness’’and‘‘devastationofthewill’’(or-
chestra without a conductor) as the core features defining
schizophrenia. Both notions imply a ‘‘devastation’’ of the
self because it is the self that imposes a sense of unity on
the multitude of mental contents. Right now, while I am
typing this text into my notebook, the unity of my ongo-
ing visual, tactile, auditory, etc. experiences is brought
about through their shared feature or character of being
my experiences. They are all given to me as their subject,
making them inherent in one (my) field of awareness.
28
Kurt Schneider noted that:
(C)ertain disturbances of self-experience show the greatest
degree of schizophrenic specificity. Here we refer to those
disturbances of first-personal-givenness(Ich-heit) or mine-
ness (Meinhaftigkeit) which consist of one’s own acts and
states not being experienced as one’s own,
32(p58).
The issue of disorders of self was widely addressed in
psychopathological literature,
19,27,30,33,34 both at a clini-
cal and a theoretical level. The view of autism, as a man-
ifestation of the fundamental changes of subjectivity
came to mark the final articulation of European view
on the ‘‘whatness’’ of schizophrenia. Thus, the ICD-8/
9 Glossary
35 defines the clinical core of schizophrenia
as a change in the patient’s structure of subjectivity: it
is ‘‘the fundamental disturbance of personality (self),
(which) involves its most basic functions, those that
give the normal person his feeling of individuality,
uniqueness, and self-direction’’ (p27; here, ‘‘personality
in its most basic functions’’ refers to the structure of
the person or the self).
More recently, 2 Scandinavian studies have indepen-
dently rediscovered the disorders of self-experience
in the schizophrenia spectrum conditions, a research
inspired by extensive semistructured interviews with
young first-admitted patients with beginning schizo-
phrenia. The patients typically complained of feeling
ephemeral, not really existing, lacking a basic identity
core, feeling profoundly different from others, and
not fully belonging to the shared world. This work
was systematically replicated on 151 first admission
c a s e sf o l l o w e du pf o r5y e a r s
36–38 and on a large, diag-
nostically stratified sample at genetic risk for schizo-
phrenia.
39
It is important to emphasize that we are dealing here
with the anomalies of experience and not with delusions
or hallucinations. Self-disorders occur both in schizo-
phrenia and schizotypal disorders. They comprise a per-
vasively diminished or insecure sense of existing as an
embodied self-present subject, various distortions of first
person perspective, eg, with anonymization of the field of
awareness or deficient ‘‘mineness’’ (‘‘my thoughts have
no respect for me’’), various alienations in the stream
of cognition, spatialization of mental contents, eg,
thoughts being experienced as located extended objects
(‘‘my thoughts always press from behind mainly here,
on the left’’), feelings of disembodiment, inadequate
ego-demarcation, and, very importantly, lack of attune-
ment to and inability of immersion in the world (‘‘I only
live in my head’’). Isolation seems here to be more solip-
sistic,‘‘growingfromwithin,’’ie,constitutive,ratherthan
operating only as a defensive withdrawal. Bleulerian ‘‘re-
treattotheinnerworld’’ismoreadequatelyseenasacon-
stitution of a different, ie, ‘‘private world’’.
The inability to project oneself forth in the world ( . . ), the
tendency to disperse oneself in the flux of subjectivity, the
disproportion between the ‘‘inside’’ and the ‘‘outside’’ of ex-
istence, constitute a constantinfrastructure ofconsciousness
( . ) in schizophrenia.
40(p167)
Self-disorders are persisting and often pervasive (trait)
phenomena, whose onset usually dates to early adoles-
cence or even childhood. The schizophrenia spectrum
patients may also experience a variety of anomalies in
all perceptual modalities.
41
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J. ParnasThe Ill-Famed ‘‘Praecox-Feeling’’
We will briefly address here the notion of ‘‘Praecox
Gefu ¨hl’’, now antiquated and out of use, but nonetheless
important for an understanding of the attempts to cap-
ture the clinical core of schizophrenia. The expression
‘‘praecox feeling’’ was coined by a Dutch psychiatrist,
Ru ¨mke
42 who claimed that the diagnosis of schizophre-
nia was sometimes bolstered by a (more or less) ineffable
intuition, probably based on a fundamental inaccessibil-
ity of the patient. Ru ¨mke’s idea was almost as old as the
concept of schizophrenia itself, and it was widely de-
scribed in schizophrenia research. Similar terms included
‘‘diagnostic par pe ´ne ´tration,’’
20 ‘‘diagnosis through intu-
ition,’’
43 or ‘‘atmospheric diagnosis’’.
44 The term ‘‘intu-
ition’’ refers in phenomenology to a direct apprehension
ofanobjectorstateofaffairs,anapprehensionthatisnot
mediated by reflection. Mu ¨ller-Suur
45 emphasized that
the original intuition of incomprehensibility could be
strengthened by a more reflective diagnostic apprehen-
sion: the incomprehensibility in schizophrenia is not
something vague but something ‘‘definitely incompre-
hensible’’. No matter how well we come to know the
patient’s psychopathology and personal history, we re-
main confronted with a residuum of definite incompre-
hensibility. Wyrsch
43 suggested that what was here at
play was a perception of an existential change. We per-
ceive a transformation of the modality of being into an
order of its own (eine Daseinsweise). What is incompre-
hensible, but nonconceptually grasped by a clinician, are
altered basic structures of the ‘‘being-in-the-world’’, eg,
the temporality and spatiality of being, the self, and basic
self-world relatedness. These structures are not concrete,
perceivable objects, like symptoms or signs; they are con-
stitutive, ie, functioning as preconceptual conditions of
our existence.
46(p48) The clinicians may perceive such
changes in a nonconceptual mode, a type of experience
that is difficult to convey in a linguistic propositional
(sentence-like) format.
The validity of the intuitive diagnosis by an experienced
clinician was documented in a spectacular way by Gottes-
man and Shields
47 in their seminal Maudsley schizophre-
nia twin study. The study showed concordance rates
among MZ- and DZ-co-twins of the schizophrenic pro-
bands to be around 50% and 10%, respectively. They in-
vited an outsider, a renowned Swedish expert on the
schizophrenia spectrum conditions (schizoidia), professor
Essen-Mo ¨ller, to blindly diagnose the vignettes of their
sample,askingforabinaryclassification:withinoroutside
the schizophrenia spectrum?. Essen-Mo ¨ller’s schizophre-
nia spectrum cases demonstrated MZ a concordance
rate of approximately 90%, without inflating the corre-
sponding DZ concordance. Gottesman and Shields con-
cluded that it was the most successful attempt of
validation of the schizophrenia spectrum concept.
However, Essen-Mo ¨ller was not able to explicate his
diagnostic performance in a descriptive, symptom-list
manner. His performance was, most likely, an instance
of Gestalt–or pattern-recognition, executed by an
extremely skilled and knowledgeable clinician.
The concept of praecox feeling gradually lost its theo-
retical and phenomenological baggage, and became triv-
ialized into a notion of ‘‘instant’’ or ‘‘first 3 minutes’’
diagnosis. Eventually, it lost all clinical significance
with the introduction of the operational criteria for diag-
nosis. In a theoretical debate preceding the formation of
the DSM-III, the ‘‘praecox-feeling’’ was considered as
emblem of psychiatry’s subjectivism, incompatible with
its scientific aspirations. The term also served as ammu-
nition for antipsychiatrists who pointed out the arbitrar-
iness and the excessive power of psychiatric labeling.
Therearecertainmisunderstandings,which,inmyview,
obscureapotentialepistemologicalimportofthenotionof
praecox feeling. The intuition arises mainly passively; it
cannot be instigated at will. It needs not to be restricted
to the first minutes of the encounter with the patient,
but may arise at any moment throughout the interview.
Itmayariseseeminglyunprovokedorprovokedbyasingle
gesture, a facial expression, or something uttered by the
patient, a something that changes the entire apprehension
ofthepatientbecauseitchangesthesignificanceoftheper-
ceived Gestalt. In such cases it resembles the experience of
aspect dawning (like, when looking at an ambiguous fig-
ure, eg, a duck–rabbit,you start toseethe rabbitand then,
your way of viewing somehow changes, and now, sud-
denly, you see the duck.
48 (193c)) There is a change in
the perception of the entire Gestalt despite no or minimal
changes at the sensory level.
In an ordinary diagnostic situation, there is no extra
intuition on the top of a Gestalt-recognition supported
by the symptom/sign-based information. The passively
experienced intuitive diagnostic hunch was never sup-
posed to be applied as an autonomous classificatory ar-
biter in a random population of patients. Rather, it was
believed to sometimes help the clinician in distinguishing
between schizophrenia and other types of psychosis
(schizophrenia vs ‘‘pseudoschizophrenia’’ [The Anglo-
phone concept of a ‘‘schizophrenia like’’ psychosis [eg,
in epilepsy], ie, a psychosis with hallucinations and delu-
sions, was certainly not ‘‘schizophrenia-like’’ in the Eu-
ropean perspective, where the specificity of
schizophrenia was dependent on the clinical core fea-
tures, rather than on the positive psychotic symptoms.]).
It is obvious that praecox-feeling, for several reasons,
cannot belong to the diagnostic tools in clinical psychia-
try. That does not cancel its clinical reality or its concep-
tual/epistemological import for schizophrenia research.
Gestalt, Prototype, and Symptom
Throughout the text, the notion of Gestalt has been reoc-
curring. This epistemological issue is in the need of
1125
The Clinical Core of Schizophreniaa further articulation because its understanding is essen-
tial in addressing the clinical core features of schizophre-
nia, ie, the defining features that constitute its
‘‘whatness’’.
49 When the preDSM-III psychopatholo-
gists emphasized this or that feature as being very char-
acteristicofschizophrenia,theydidnotusetheconceptof
a symptom/sign as it is being used today in the opera-
tional approach. This latter approach envisages the
symptoms and signs as being (ideally) third person
data,namelyasreified(thing-like),mutuallyindependent
(atomic) entities, devoidof meaning and therefore appro-
priate for context-independent definitions and unprob-
lematic assessments. It is as if the symptom/sign and
its causal substrate were assumed to exhibit the same de-
scriptive nature: both are spatio-temporally delimited
objects, ie, things. In this paradigm, the symptoms and
signs have no intrinsic sense or meaning. They are almost
entirely referring, ie, pointing to the underlying abnor-
malities ofanatomo-physiological substrate.This scheme
of ‘‘symptoms = causal referents’’ is automatically acti-
vated in the mind of a physician confronting a medical-
somatic illness. Yet the psychiatrist, who confronts his
‘‘psychiatric object’’, finds himself in a situation without
analog in the somatic medicine.
21 The psychiatrist does
notconfrontaleg,anabdomen,notathing,butaperson,
ie, broadly speaking, another embodied consciousness.
What the patient manifests is not isolated symptoms/
signs with referring functions but rather certain wholes
of mutually implicative, interpenetrating experiences,
feelings, beliefs, expressions, and actions, all permeated
by biographical detail. The psychiatric typifications
and reflections start from these meaning-wholes. The lat-
ter are not constituted by the referential symptom func-
tion but by their meaning. We do not (with few
exceptions) know causal referents in any diagnostically
relevant sense. From a phenomenological point of
view, a diagnostic encounter is a second person situation,
a process through which we evaluate expressions in con-
junction with experiences. We extract, represent, and in-
dividuate from the flow of the patient’s subjective life
certain repeatable(invariant)constellationsof experience
and expression, certain meaningful wholes. A psychiatric
symptom or sign only emerges as an individuated entity
(as this or that symptom) in the context of other, simul-
taneous, preceding, and succeeding experiences. A smile
as such cannot be predefined as silly; the silliness of
a smile can only emerge in the context of the flow of
expressions relative to a particular discourse.
These are the epistemological constraints behind the
fact that all descriptions of the phenomenological speci-
ficity of schizophrenia were invariably located at a more
encompassing level than the notion of a single, context-
independentsymptom orsign (eg, the conceptsof autism,
lack of vital contact with reality, disunity of conscious-
ness, etc.). Indeed, the very idea of a context-independent
phenomenological feature would probably never cross
the mind of a preDSM-III psychopathologist. Imagine
a case of ‘‘social phobia’’, caused by fear of physical con-
tact with other people, a proximity being experienced as
engulfing and annihilating. We would probably not con-
sider this ‘‘phobia’’ as an isolated behavioral dysfunction
butratherasbeingindicativeofalargerwholeofinsecure
identity and self-demarcation, with avoidant coping be-
havior ensuing by implication. Consider, as another ex-
ample, ‘‘mumbling speech’’. In itself it is perhaps
characteristic of 5% of population. Yet, in a specific di-
agnostic context, eg, if associated with mannerist allure,
inappropriate affect, and vagueness of thought, it
acquires a psychopathological significance.
The notion of Gestalt helps here to express the whole-
ness of the clinical picture that constrains the particular-
ity of its component features and accounts for the
epistemic nature of the diagnostic encounter. Gestalt ele-
ments are always present in the clinical diagnostic pro-
cess, and so are the typification processes, ie,
progressive differential diagnostic approximations that
ultimately result in the allocation of the investigated en-
tity into a particular class. A Gestalt is a salient unity or
organization of phenomenal aspects. This unity emerges
from the relations between component features (part-
part-whole relations) but cannot be reduced to their sim-
ple aggregate (whole is more than the sum of its parts).
The Gestalt’s aspects are interdependent in a mutually
constitutive and implicative manner
22 and the whole of
Gestalt codetermines the nature and specificity of its par-
ticular aspects, while, at the same time, the whole receives
from the single aspects its concrete clinical rootedness. A
Gestalt cuts across the dichotomies of ‘‘inner and outer,’’
‘‘form and content,’’ ‘‘universal and particular.’’ The sa-
lience of eg, interpersonal encounter does not normally
emerge in piecemeal-disconnected allusions to the
patient’s inner life on the one hand, in addition to inde-
pendently salient fragments of his visible expressions, on
the other hand. Rather, the person articulates himself
through certain wholes, jointly constituted by his experi-
ence, belief, and expression (inner and outer). ‘‘What’’ he
says (content) is always molded by the ‘‘how’’ (form) of
his way of thinking and experiencing. A Gestalt instan-
tiatesacertaingeneralityoftype(eg,thispatientistypical
of a category X), but this typicality is always modified,
because it is necessarily embodied in a particular, con-
crete individual, thus deforming the ideal clarity of
type (universal and particular). The Gestalt always
expresses a certain likeness to its prototype. Typifica-
tions may be shared by other psychiatrists and assessed
for the interrater reliability. The gestaltic nature of
‘‘mental object’’ does not preclude that the formal diag-
nosis may follow a list of prespecified criteria, because
nothing a priori forbids constructing a list of criteria
with reflect the diagnostic Gestalt (It takes 2 years of
residency with a weekly 2–3 hours of psychopathology
teaching [concepts, live interviews followed by
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Signs Symptoms
Gestalt
Designations
Structure of
Subjectivity
Existential
orientation
Various disorders
of all modalities of
expression/bizarreness
Inadequate (parathymia)
or diminished affective
modulation
Paramimia (disorganized
facial expression)
Parakinetic and stereotypic
facial (eg, paraocular)
and other movements
Peculiar stiff posture with
lumbar hyperextension,
forward cervical bent,
and lack of arm swing
(Gebundenheit)
Shifting, capricious, or
shallow emotions/moods
Staring or elusive or
vigilant gaze
Excessive parallelism of ocular axes
Radical impenetrability/no
emotional reciprocity/rigidity
Indifference
Varieties of formal thought
disorder, especially
vagueness, derailment,
metonymy
Stilted, mannerist
appearance/behavior/speech
Eccentricity/Antagonomia/Negativism
Mirror-phenomenon-observable
Detachment, Withdrawal,
Social isolation/social anxiety
Inappropriate behavior
(crazy actions)
Perplexity
Ambivalence/poly-valence
Sense of loss of meaning;
emptiness, nonbeing
(depression)
Hyper-reﬂectivity
Self-disorders: diminished
self-presence, disturbed ﬁrst
person perspective,
disembodiment, spatialization
of mental life, disorders of
the stream of
thoughts (blocking, pressure,
perceptualization), porous
ego-boundaries, lack of
basic sense of identity, sense
of unclarity or opaqueness of
consciousness, anhedonia,
devitalization,
solipsism/grandiosity,
etc.
Mirror-phenomenon-as
subjective experience
Ontological insecurity and
anxiety, fear of existence,
fear of dissolution
Disorders of attention and
perception (esp. visual
and auditory)
Anomalous bodily
sensations
Discordance
‘‘Spaltung’’
Disunity of
consciousness
Intrapsychic
ataxia
Autism
Unstable ﬁrst
person perspective
Diminished
self-presence
Hyper-reﬂexivity
Diminished
immersion in
the world
Changes in
temporality
Changes in
embodiment
Changes in
intersubjectivity
Inaction
‘‘Crazy projects’’
Altered existential
orientation:
(new) interest
in philosophy,
mysticism,
adherence to
a religious or
a political
sect, or other
‘‘alternative
community’’ etc.
Clinician’s
nonconceptual
perception of
an altered
existential
mode
The table attempts to provide an extended but not exhaustive summary of descriptions of the clinical core of schizophrenia. The ﬁrst 2
columns from the left list the single features, first as ‘‘signs’’ and then as ‘‘symptoms,’’ which are frequently described as trait-typical of
schizophrenia and its spectrum conditions. The third column indicates the frequently utilized terms or labels for the perceived core
Gestalt. The last 2 columns indicate the overarching Gestalt, first articulated as disorders of the structure of subjectivity (such as self-
world relation or temporality), and the last column refers to certain global changes, perceivable at the level of the patient’s existence.
The question of specificity or ‘‘whatness’’ of schizophrenia was answerable with a reference to these larger Gestalts.
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duce a reliable and competent ‘‘prototypical’’ clinician).
Recently, a more gestaltic approach has been proposed
for the DSM-V.
50
Conclusions and Implications
There was a consensus among schizophrenia researchers
in the European tradition that the specificity of schizo-
phrenia was not to be found in the positive psychotic
symptoms. Even Kurt Schneider, while cherishing his di-
agnostic notion of first rank symptoms, referred to
a larger Gestalt and to the disorders of subjectivity struc-
ture (self-disorders) as a condition for the emergence of
certain psychotic phenomena. When confronting schizo-
phrenia,wesay,paraphrasingJaspersandothers,‘‘unun-
derstandable,’’ ‘‘impenetrable,’’ or ‘‘bizarre,’’ we express
a sense of confronting a condition not only marked by
circumscribedabnormalmentalcontentsbutalso,rather,
a structural change of subjectivity (mentality, conscious-
ness). The clinical core manifests itself, and is graspable,
asalargerwhole,aGestaltemergingacross amanifoldof
symptoms and signs. These single features may occur in
all domains of mental life: affect-expression, motivation,
mood, cognition, willing, and action table 1.
This core disorder was believed to possess a generative
status, making the clinical picture less enigmatic and
endowed with certain coherence between its elements
(vide supra, the ‘‘social phobia’’).
22,36 A subtler articula-
tion of such core marked the extension of the schizophre-
nia spectrum disorders. Needless to say, it was the core
that was considered as etiologically significant. Minkow-
ski
20 was among the first to propose a diathesis-stress
model of the etiology of schizophrenia:
The notion of schizophrenia as a mental illness can be
decomposed into two factors, of different order. First, the
schizoidia [theclinicalcore], which isa constitutional, highly
specific and temporally enduring factor, and, second, a nox-
ious nonspecific factor of [environmental] evolutive nature.
This noxious factor, acting upon the [vulnerability of] schiz-
oidia, transforms the latter into schizophrenia,
20 (p50–51) my
translation and insertion in square brackets).
Thispresentationofschizophreniapaintsapicturethat
is rather different from the corresponding concepts of the
DSM-IV and ICD-10. The operational definitions only
capture a fragment of the clinical core. Both the negative
anddisorganizedsymptomsare,becauseofreliabilitycon-
cerns, stipulated on a very high severity level, effectively
precluding a diagnosis of many nonparanoid cases.
More importantly, the negative symptoms are conceived
of as quantitative deficits, fall-outs of normal functions
(too little), which are signaled by the deprivative alpha:
a-logia, a-volition, an-ergia, etc. This deficit view, how-
ever, has a limited resemblance to the clinical core of
schizophrenia.
15Blankenburg
25evokedhereaninsightful
and useful dictum: ‘‘the Minus (the deficit) in schizophre-
niaiscausedbytheAliter(thedifferent[strange]),whereas
thereverseistruefortheorganicdementia.’’Psychiatrists,
trained today, have difficulty in indentifying and describ-
ing clinically significant formal thought disorder, disor-
dered discourse, and varieties of disintegrated
expressivity. Most importantly, however, the sense of
thefundamentalGestaltorprototypehasvanished.Clini-
cians are not taught and therefore not aware of the char-
acteristicGestaltofschizophrenia,ofits‘‘whatness’’.This
prototype, especially salient in hebephrenia, eludes the
diagnostic radar. These patients become frequently
diagnosed as borderline personality disorder, social
phobia, anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD),andaffectivedisorder.Weknowfromthestatistics
ofthe DanishNational PsychiatricRegister that since the
introductionoftheICD-10,the‘‘borderline’’diagnosishas
exploded while hebephrenia diagnosis now only accounts
for1%ofallfirstdiagnosedcasesofschizophrenia(thereis
no reason to believe that the situation is dramatically dif-
ferentwithDSM-IV).Thepolydiagnosticstudiesindicate
that DSM-IV/ICD-10 schizophrenia definition reliably
captures a chronic paranoid-hallucinatory subset of
schizophrenia patients. Chronicity is here inbuilt, partly
by the duration criteria, but mainly because the disorga-
nized and negative symptoms are defined on a very high
severitylevel,thenumberoforiginalSchneideriancriteria
is reduced, and many of those retained have been trans-
formed from anomalous experiences to delusions (taking
time to become articulated).
Viewed through the lens of the continental concept,
many of the currently ‘‘easy’’ psychopathological
issues (considered as merely technical psychometric
problems) would reacquire important conceptual
dimensions (eg, chronicity, onset, datability of onset,
the concept of psychosis, and the issue of early
detection).
It is beyond our scope to assess the consequences of
the phenomenological and epistemological discontinu-
ity between the classic European and the current oper-
ational versions of the schizophrenia concept. The
change in the concept of schizophrenia is, at least in
part, a reflection of a more overarching epistemological
change, concerning the status of ‘‘psychiatric object’’
( t h er e a s o n sw h yap a t i e n ts e e sap s y c h i a t r i s t ) .T h i s
change may be viewed, depending on perspective, pos-
itively, as a sign of progress, or negatively, as a sign of
regression (or as a mixture of both). It would require
another study to articulate the contents and processes
of that change.
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